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Abstract (145/150 words) 
This paper explores environmental innovation in the largest emerging economy – China - and 
its potential for contributing to global transitions to low-carbon, more sustainable patterns of 
development.  It builds on earlier studies bringing alternative forms of low(er)-technology, 
‘below-the-radar’, ‘disruptive’ and/or social innovation into its analysis.  In addition, 
however, the paper develops our understanding of low-carbon innovation by paying 
particular attention to issues of changing power relations and social practices; theoretical 
issues that need attention in the literature generally but are notably absent when studying 
transitions in China.  This shift in perspective allows four neglected questions to be 
introduced and, in each case, points to both opportunities and challenges to low-carbon 
system transition that are overlooked by an orthodox focus on technological innovations 
alone.  These are briefly illustrated by drawing on examples from three key domains of low-
carbon innovation: solar-generated energy; electric urban mobility; and food and agriculture.  
 
Keywords: transition, innovation, low-carbon, China, power relations, practice  
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Introduction  
 
Scientific studies of climate change and other planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009; 
Steffen et al., 2015) suggest current forms of development risk taking us out of the ecological 
‘safe operating space’, requiring broad systemic changes in order to avoid unpredictable 
impacts at a global level. These dramatic and rapid reductions in emissions are possible only 
by way of radical and globally extensive transformations in the socio-technical systems that 
shape the production and consumption of energy in all its forms. In early 2015, we see little 
evidence of the systemic changes needed to mitigate climate change and to deal with other 
environmental crises.  
 
China is central to achieving such a transformation: energy demand has increased with the 
country’s rapid economic growth, averaging 10% p.a. for 30 years, so that, given factors such 
as its high dependence on coal – China’s coal-fired power sector is the world’s largest single 
anthropogenic source of CO2 emissions (Harris, 2010) – the country has become the world’s 
largest absolute carbon dioxide emitting nation. Similar developments have been observed in 
total energy use, as demand in other sectors, such as agriculture and transport, have also seen 
high and increasing demand. Figure 1 shows just how dramatically China’s electricity 
production has risen since 1970, and Figure 2 compares how CO2 emissions have increased 
in recent decades in comparison to that in other countries.  
 
Figure 1: Electricity production between 1970 and 2010 in China, billions kWh. Sources: 
World Bank, 2014 and IEA, 2014. 
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Figure 2: Total volume of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and cement production for 
selected countries, 1000 million tonnes of CO2, 1990-2012. Source: Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency 
 
 
  
 
 
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
4500 
5000 
1
9
6
0
 
1
9
6
2
 
1
9
6
4
 
1
9
6
6
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
0
 
1
9
7
2
 
1
9
7
4
 
1
9
7
6
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
8
0
 
1
9
8
2
 
1
9
8
4
 
1
9
8
6
 
1
9
8
8
 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
8
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
1
0
 
B
il
li
o
n
s
 k
W
h
 
USA 
EU‐27 
China 
India 
Brazil 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
1
9
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
 
1
9
9
2
 
1
9
9
3
 
1
9
9
4
 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
2
0
1
1
 
2
0
1
2
 
1
0
0
0
 M
il
li
o
n
 T
o
n
n
e
s
 C
O
2
 
4 
 
A key question for scholars of the ‘green transformation’ is thus how such transformation can 
be achieved and maximally expedited (Schmitz 2015). Globally, the discourse of innovation 
has been put forward as a major way of ‘fixing’ climate change alongside broader arguments 
for developing ‘sustainability-oriented innovation systems’ (Altenburg and Pegels, 2012).  
Similar themes have been adopted in discussions of the ‘entrepreneurial state’ (Mazzucato, 
2013), which stress the vital role of governments, not only in driving R&D investment in 
strategic ‘green’ sectors, but also in constructing a market for innovation and in building the 
skilled workforce required to serve emerging areas of eco-innovation.    
 
Therefore, not only as the world’s largest greenhouse-gas emitter, but also as the world’s 
second-largest economy, China’s potential transformation to a low-carbon, climate resilient 
or ‘post-carbon’ society is a key concern for the world.  This paper, based on early 
indications from our research in three key sectors – food and agriculture; energy; and urban 
mobility – finds that this transformation is still overwhelmingly conceptualized in terms of 
the opportunities regarding ‘high-technology’ innovation at the technological ‘frontier’; a 
narrative that resonates with techno-nationalist calls from the Chinese leadership for 
‘indigenous’ or ‘independent’ innovation as a driver for competitiveness and growth 
(Jakobson, 2007, Zhao 2010). This paper offers a different understanding of innovation that 
promises to be more productive in that it signals both opportunities and challenges that the 
high-technology-focussed approach overlooks.  
 
Instead, this approach explores the complex, systemic and emergent nature of the multiple 
processes involved in transition. In particular, going beyond existing systems transition 
literature, this involves a re-insertion and reconceptualization of power in the process of low-
carbon transition, and greater attention to the role and habituated practices of societal actors, 
including users and producers.  As such, both opportunities and challenges to low-carbon 
transition, and particularly in the context of ongoing (national) projects of development 
‘catch-up’, emerge along four dimensions. These concern the potential systemic importance 
of:  
1. Bottom-up, emergent vs. top-down co-ordinated innovation and transition governance 
(Smith et al 2005);  
2. Low(er)-technology, ‘below-the-radar’, ‘disruptive’ or ‘frugal’ innovations vs. hi-tech 
innovation (Kaplinsky 2010, Breznitz and Murphree 2011);  
3. Social vs. technological aspects of innovations (Smith and Ely 2015); and,  
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4. Innovation demand vs. supply (Bhidé 2009).  
 
This heuristic serves to highlight the potentially significant but neglected contribution to 
expedited system transitions of forms of innovation that may be both particularly appropriate 
and effective in fast-developing societies such as China (and the other ‘emerging 
economies’).  It is also used to present our preliminary findings, as summarised in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Overlooked Challenges and Opportunities Across 4-Dimensions of Low-
Carbon Innovation in China – Examples from Agri-food, Solar energy and E-mobility 
 
 Challenges Opportunities 
Bottom-up/Top-down Green public sphere, crucial for 
management and driving of low-
carbon innovations, is limited. 
Significant state resources (Cf 
Mazzucato 2013) could be 
deployed to support and develop 
existing bottom-up ‘indigenous’ 
successes. 
Low-tech/High-tech Low public trust and complex 
politics around the approval of 
R&D-intensive, high-tech 
agricultural approaches.   
Considerable consumer demand 
and institutional innovation in the 
areas of agro-ecological 
approaches to agriculture and 
food.  
Social/Technological Multiple barriers to installation of 
solar PV modules, without 
attention to cost, local grid 
capacity and social practices.  
Much to learn from existing 
‘demand’ successes in the 
successful diffusion of solar water 
heaters: low-cost standalone 
systems that have not benefited 
from central state support.  
Demand/Supply EV/E2W alike are at best niches, 
not system transitions, without 
significant consumer appeal in 
context of social politics of 
autonomy and status. 
Existing ‘demand’ successes could 
be supported, e.g. by developing 
the E2W as basis of wholly new, 
equitable and locally-relevant 
urban mobility system. 
 
6 
 
Preliminary findings 
 
1. Bottom-Up and Top-Down 
 
The benefits of attending to changing social practices and power relations in Chinese low-
carbon innovation can be illustrated by studying its politics, by which we refer not only to 
laws and changes in formal institutions of government but the full complex system of 
dynamic power relations constitutive of the field.  
 
Historically, China’s national Five-Year Plans (FYPs) have played a key role in setting the 
country’s key strategic, economic and innovation priorities, with the Sixth FYP (1981-1985), 
at the start of China’s Reform Era, being the first to include energy conservation efforts – 
around the same time that China passed the first of its environmental laws and regulations. 
The 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) was the first to include the term sustainable 
development (Geall and Pellisery, 2012), and in 1997, the 15th Party Congress listed the 
‘huge environmental and resource pressures caused by population growth and economic 
development’ as major difficulties facing the Chinese population.  
 
More recently, tackling climate change has become increasingly central to (central) 
government agendas. China published the first national climate-change plan of any 
developing country in 2007, which formalised China’s commitment to addressing climate-
change mitigation and adaptation, while also upholding the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’ and integrating climate change into other policies for national 
and social economic development – thus establishing that climate policies do not take priority 
over other national objectives (Harris, 2010). Climate change is also emphasised in the 12
th
 
Five-Year Plan (for 2011-15) (NDRC, 2011), which lists seven strategic emerging industries 
for support – including environmental protection & energy efficiency, new energy, 
biotechnology and clean-energy vehicles – and pledges a reduction in energy consumption 
per unit of GDP (energy intensity) by 16%, a carbon intensity reduction of 17% and a target 
for non-fossil fuel to account for 11.4% of primary energy consumption.  
 
China, despite dramatic transformations in its socio-economy and associated power relations, 
remains effectively a one-party state.  The result has been a variant of ‘state capitalism’ (e.g. 
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Huang, 2008; Tsai, 2007). Although privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has 
proceeded apace since the 1990s (WB/DRC, 2012), the political economic domination of 
major SOE national champions and the associated ‘cadre-capitalist alliance’ (So 2003) of top 
party-state leaders and SOE managers has ‘reached a new peak in recent years’ (Zhang, 2011: 
148). In 2009, the total profits of two giant SOEs (Sinopec and China Mobile) were larger 
than those of the largest 500 private companies. State-owned companies account for 80% of 
the stock market, including the three largest companies by revenues (all in the Global Fortune 
top 10). Nominally ‘private’ companies, especially national champions, are closely connected 
with state institutions.  This also profoundly affects innovation policy, which is targeted to 
the techno-nationalist development of the global competitiveness of the largest and most-
technologically advanced SOEs as forms of ‘indigenous innovation’ (zizhu chuangxin) in the 
hope of moving ‘up the value chain’ while (and/or as means of) preserving the party-state 
political regime (Zhao 2010). 
 
Since 2006, the central government, as buyer and seller in key industries, has introduced 
stringent, complex and fast-changing regulations on high-tech foreign enterprises mandating 
high local-content requirements and transfer of proprietary technologies (Hout and 
Ghemawat, 2010).  Through a suite of policies and investments, the country has managed to 
build (or acquire) world-leading firms in strategic ‘green’ sectors such as manufacturing solar 
panels and wind turbines (Lema and Lema, 2012). However, economic decentralisation has 
played an important role in unleashing these forces during the Reform Era. Rather than being 
a monolithic system, China’s governance of science, innovation and environmental decision-
making in the Reform Era – the ‘state’ of its ‘state capitalism’ – has been characterised by 
‘fragmented authoritarianism’, with protracted bargaining between bureaucratic units, 
including ministries, advisory bodies and top-level ‘National Leading Groups’ (Heggelund, 
2004), as well as horizontal fragmentation between levels of government (Economy, 2005). 
Recent Chinese observers of the effects of this decentralisation note the extent to which a 
‘project system’ logic has been instituted across government at all levels: a ‘governance 
model between the traditional system and market mechanisms’ (Tian, 2014: 1) where local 
governments compete for projects to attract special funding from central government. 
 
While the ‘ideological foundation’ of such a system is technocratic (Tian, 2014: 3), its ‘expert 
rationality’ often acts instead as ‘cover for sectoral interests and interest groups’. In practice, 
writes Kelly (2014: 57) such an arrangement: ‘produces governance that sits uncomfortably 
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half-way between full-scale planning signed off by ministers and the flexibility and canny 
differentiation of the market.’  The result is compromised dynamics of innovation, with many 
top-down government innovation projects (e.g. in EVs and the building of associated 
charging infrastructures) adopted at best half-heartedly by SOEs and/or local governments 
tasked with the ‘implementation’ of innovation plans. Moreover, the political dominance of 
incumbent Chinese ‘carbon (state) capital’ in a system of innovation that remains so highly 
politicised and dependent on close connections with state institutions significantly hinders the 
emergence of potentially system-disruptive low-carbon innovations. 
 
Conversely, non-governmental actors, institutions and discourses have greater sway over 
decision-making around environment, climate change and innovation policies than in 
previous eras. Over the past two decades, citizen oversight, media coverage and other forms 
of public participation by civil society have been given greater space to improve the local 
enforcement of environmental regulations in the context of waning state capacity for such 
governance. While many of China’s institutional procedures for public participation and 
environmental transparency are vague and poorly enforced, environmental NGOs have 
proliferated (e.g. 492,000 legally registered social organisations, according to a 2012 
government report, of which many are ‘green’) and a ‘green public sphere’ has emerged 
(Calhoun and Yang, 2007, our emphasis). Concerns about environmental issues have 
increased among China’s newly enriched middle class, with opinions expressed more freely 
and rapidly than ever before due to increasingly ubiquitous social media and messaging 
technologies. Urban protests increasingly focus around the lack of transparency and 
accountability concerning potentially polluting developments (Geall and Hilton, 2014), and 
according to some in the Chinese government, they represent the most common catalyst for 
‘mass incidents’ or protests.  
 
The emergence of a (‘bottom-up’) green public sphere is arguably crucial for power 
momentum behind any low-carbon transition, and for the development of the social 
capacities to manage and drive forward further low-carbon innovation (Smith and Ely 2015).  
Yet it is still merely tolerated in China and in perpetual threat of clampdown (Jacobs and 
Buckley 2015).  The emergence and strength of a green public sphere is thus a key challenge. 
However, a major opportunity for Chinese low-carbon innovation illuminated by this 
perspective is the possibility of a fusion of approaches, whereby the state could deploy its 
significant resources (institutional, human resource, technological, financial etc…) to give 
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transformative top-down support and massive infrastructural direction to the accelerated 
further innovation of what are already bottom-up, if ‘low(er)-tech’, innovation successes in 
China.  This leads to the second and third set of issues. 
 
2. Low(er)-tech & high-tech approaches 
 
In the domain of agri-food systems (Ely et al., 2014) initial research indicates that higher-tech 
approaches to low-carbon innovation have so far overlooked some of the social, political and 
demand-side barriers to a coordinated, sustainability-oriented transition. The dominant focus 
of ‘low-carbon innovation’ in Chinese agriculture have been supply-side measures, such as 
the centrally-supported development of genetically modified phytase maize as a potential 
component of intensive, high external input agriculture and livestock systems. Phytase is an 
enzyme that when added to maize facilitates the absorption of phosphorous in monogastric 
animals like pigs. If effective, transgenic high-phytase maize could reduce the requirement 
for land or fertiliser for any particular meat yield, given the higher bioavailability of 
phosphorus.  
 
However, early indications are that low levels of public trust and significant political 
disagreement have been an unforeseen factor in creating significant delays in the renewal of 
the biosafety certificate for phytase maize by the Ministry of Agriculture after it expired last 
year. Public debates about food safety in China are characterised by “extreme anxiety and 
uncertainty” (FORHEAD 2014: 53–4) and our research seems to confirm Keeley’s (2005: 
157) observation that China’s 'embrace of the biotechnology revolution [was] not as 
unequivocal as much global discourse suggests', particularly among end consumers. 
 
Concurrently, initial research indicates that “lower-tech” alternatives exist in the agri-food 
domain that could be better explored with greater attention to politics and practice. The 
growth of low external input and organic community-supported agriculture (CSA) farms 
around first-tier cities in China; new networks connecting farmers and consumers, often 
enabled through digital communications technologies, such as the Beijing Farmers Market, or 
the Farmers Seed Network, which has encouraged seed saving and traditional forms of seed 
exchange in rural Guangxi, as well as retail direct from small-scale producers to “ecological” 
restaurants in the provincial capital Nanning; and online retail for low-volume, high-quality 
specialised organic food commodities, all indicate how changing social relations – 
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particularly with regard to China’s emerging middle class(es) – might enable new kinds of 
‘bottom-up’, lower-tech innovation alternatives that could avoid the sorts of high-carbon 
lock-ins and rebound effects that are likely to result from greater intensification of China’s 
livestock system.  
 
3. Social & technological aspects 
 
In the field of solar-generated energy (Urban and Geall, 2014), initial research indicates that 
despite China having become the world’s largest investor in solar photovoltaics – an IP- and 
R&D-intensive industry that the Chinese government has centrally supported and is now the 
world’s largest investor, producer and exporter – systemic barriers to the installation of solar 
PV modules remain. Many, though not all, of these barriers have social, rather than technical, 
components, and these include: grid connectivity and reform, since certain policies, such as 
capacity-based subsidies, have driven the construction of renewable energy infrastructure 
without matching grid connectivity, and policies such as Feed-in-Tariffs (FiTs) have assumed 
higher levels of knowledge and monitoring capacity on the part of electricity consumers and 
local grids, respectively, than currently exists; property rights, since some approaches, 
including FiTs, assume energy users own their own properties or roof-spaces to install PV 
modules; and cost, given the relatively large up-front cost of a PV module and related costs 
associated with installation and replacement of sometimes unreliable supporting components, 
such as inverters.  Conversely, in the case of solar water heaters – where fewer of these 
barriers exist – China has the world’s largest installed capacity (REN21, 2012). These low-
cost standalone systems have not only been very popular, and therefore constitute largely 
undiscussed agents in the transition from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy, but also indicate 
where closer attention to social aspects and elements of practice could point to previously 
unexplored potential drivers and pathways for disruptive, low-cost and low-carbon 
innovation.  
 
4. Demand & supply 
 
Finally, as regards the issue of demand for innovation, perhaps the clearest example of this 
key issue in Chinese low-carbon innovation emerges from comparison of the electric vehicle 
(EV, i.e. electric car) and the electric two-wheeler (E2W, or e-bike) (see Tyfield, Zuev et al., 
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2014).  The former is the beneficiary and focus of amongst the most ambitious and concerted 
programmes of national industrial policy in the world for EV transitions, while the latter 
receives effectively no government support and is officially banned in many cities.   
 
Yet E2Ws are effectively ubiquitous in Chinese cities (even those with the municipal bans), 
numbering some 180 million on recent estimates, while EVs are struggling to achieve any 
sales beyond those bought through programmes of government procurement for taxi 
companies. The key issue here is that the EV has effectively no attraction to possible 
consumers, even with significant purchase subsidies and other financial perks, being seen as a 
relatively expensive but utterly unglamorous car.  As such, the EV is in competition with 
premium, foreign (particularly German) conventional cars; vehicles, moreover, that are the 
focus of a consumer desire that is much more than mere utility ‘preference’ but bears the 
weight of a profound social thirst for experiences of personal autonomy and status 
competition that are vested specifically in consumer choices.  Conversely, the E2W is a 
cheap, convenient and overwhelmingly indigenous technology that offers to the majority of 
the population the possibility of faster, cheap and utilitarian mobility. 
 
In these circumstances, therefore, focusing on demand, not just supply, from a perspective of 
changing power relations and social practices suggests that the EV has little prospects of 
catalysing a system transition in urban mobility on its current form – basically, a standard car 
with a different engine. Nor will Chinese car companies likely succeed in achieving a new 
global dominance on the back of their mastery of this technology.  The key challenge, rather, 
is for a Chinese EV to be developed that has unquestionable market appeal – whether directly 
targeting the wealthy (such as in the case of Tesla) or offering a different prospect of urban 
mobility that makes the EV unquestionably more cost- and time-effective.  Conversely, a key 
opportunity thus highlighted returns us to the point made above regarding the potential for the 
Chinese state to throw its full weight behind the development of an entirely new model of 
urban mobility based upon (indigenous) E2Ws and their further innovation into new, compact 
and lightweight vehicles. 
 
Thus, in all three domains, the profoundly systemic nature of the transition required – in how 
China eats, moves and heats and powers its homes – and the complex interdependencies 
involved in such changes, warrant a greater focus on wider options beyond high-tech, on the 
dynamics of bottom up vs. top down, on social aspects and ultimately on the multitude of 
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users on the demand side. These are only some of many preliminary possibilities, which we 
will also be exploring further in the course of our research. However we also now place them 
within the wider literature in order to better discuss these initial findings.  
 
‘High-Tech’ Innovation and its Limitations 
 
In 2014, in a speech to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and Chinese Academy of 
Engineering (CAE), China’s President Xi Jinping stated that: ‘the direction of China's science 
and technology development is “innovation, innovation and innovation”’ and noted that 
‘independent innovation’ should be the ‘essence’ of a strategy to ‘free up the huge potentials 
of science and technology’ (Xinhua, 2014). The same sort of high-tech focus is evident in 
what is now a large and rapidly growing literature on low-carbon innovation in China that 
documents impressive developments regarding some renewable technologies such as wind 
energy, solar photovoltaics, hydropower and electric vehicles (EVs).   
 
Scholars have begun to adopt an innovation systems approach to investigate the role of 
policies, firm strategies and university-led R&D in building China’s eco-innovation 
capabilities (Altenburg and Pegels, 2012) and the prospects of success of ‘indigenous 
innovation’ policies in the current form and focus.  Some authors have questioned how 
quickly the country’s firms can come to a position of dominance, describing the journey 
towards eco-innovation leadership as a ‘hard slog’ rather than a ‘leapfrog’ (Rock et al., 
2009). Others, drawing from examples in coal-fired electricity generation, cement production 
and electric vehicles have pointed towards China as an example of how developing countries 
can adopt a strategic approach to building low-carbon technological capabilities within 
domestic firms (Watson et al., 2014). 
 
Lema and Lema (2012) have analysed the shift from conventional ‘technology transfer’ to 
joint ventures and technology acquisition by Chinese (and Indian) firms in the wind energy 
industry and, working with other colleagues, Lema analysed in detail how Chinese wind 
power firms impacted on global value chains by component suppliers (Lema et al., 2013). 
Drawing on technological innovation systems approaches, Gosens et al., (2013) investigated 
learning in clean-tech innovation.  Fischer (2012) has provided detailed accounts of the 
technology, policy and political barriers and challenges that characterised the Chinese PV 
sector, while Dai (2014) conducted political analyses of wind energy policy at national and 
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local levels of government.  Our findings confirm the value of these studies, but raise further 
questions about the role of power and practices, pointing to important future research. 
 
In particular, while they provide certain insights into the politics of innovation policy, they 
still focus primarily on the supply side, or, like the ‘transition studies’ literature in general 
(Geels, 2002 – see next section), treat the demand side from an economic, ‘market’ 
perspective. As such, while they provide a good basis for understanding industrial 
development in these strategic sectors, with a few exceptions, they engage less with political 
and sociological questions of transition (though see Geels, 2014).  The result is that where 
these qualitative issues are especially important and/or fraught, insight is diminished; yet this 
is precisely the case regarding both transition to low-carbon ‘economy-and-society’ (Urry, 
2011) and in China in particular.  
 
‘Practices’ and ‘Power’: Neglected Areas in Chinese Low-Carbon Innovation and 
Transitions  
 
The socio-technical transitions literature opens a much more detailed, nuanced and 
informative analysis of the processes and progress of low-carbon innovation in China than a 
techno-centric approach. Yet two crucial aspects to the ‘social’ (and hence socio-technical) 
nature of innovations are:  
• the process of successful and widespread demonstration and deployment of an 
innovation beyond a specialised niche, through underlying social practices and their 
transformation (Smith et al., 2010); and,  
• whence the dynamism behind any successfully emergent system innovation, and its 
social provenance and character (Tyfield, 2014).  
 
These remain under-developed in the literature on low-carbon innovation in general, with 
significant analytical cost, but are particularly evident gaps when analysing low-carbon 
innovation in China. Our approach places these considerations at centre-stage, in terms of 
concerted empirical and theoretical attention to the issues of social practices and power 
relations respectively. 
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As regards the former aspect, most analysis of low-carbon innovation in China focuses upon 
issues of production. The reception and consumption of innovations, including changes in 
associated social practices (Shove and Walker, 2010), is largely neglected. Social practice 
theorists critique the notion that behaviour (and potential behaviour change) can be 
understood as rational, cognitive individual processes, highlighting how practices are social, 
loaded with social meaning, affect and identity, habitual or routinised, systemically-situated 
and performative.  
 
Such an approach sees social practices not only as mediating many of the relationships 
between the elements in socio-technical transitions, but also as ordering and orchestrating the 
interactions between them in a ‘nexus’ of practices (McMeekin and Southerton 2012). Thus 
reconfiguring practices around a particular technology can actually lead to changes in other 
interlocking habits, opening up opportunities for new innovations to emerge and play a 
reinforcing or steering role in niche or pathway development.  This is particularly important 
in China, where the disruption of economic reforms, urbanisation and other social and 
environmental changes are in turn destabilising habitual routines for many people. Evidence 
from the electric vehicles case illustrates quite clearly that cultural meanings, such as social 
status, have an effect on practices, which are undergoing significant change and are the arena 
of affective efforts by Chinese citizens seeking new meanings and identities amidst change.  
 
The dynamic interplay between power relations and transitions, while its central importance 
has long been recognised (Smith et al., 2010), is far from well understood.  There are actors 
who are committed to, and are likely to benefit from, significant systemic changes involved 
in any transition process, and often organise to try to bring it about (Smith, 2007).  Yet the 
systemic complexity of socio-technical transitions means they are unlikely to emerge 
according to the blueprint of any single (set of) actor(s).   
 
Studies of the politics of transition in Europe have begun to study these processes by looking 
at the interests and institutions concerned (e.g. Kern, 2011; Lockwood et al., 2013). But 
generally conceptualized in terms of given institutions, interests and structural inequalities in 
access to resources – amounting to ‘techno-institutional lock-in’ (Unruh 2000) – most of this 
literature tends both to illuminate only the structural difficulties facing emerging systems 
transitions, rather than strategic openings, and to take as given the basic institutional forms of 
politics and decision-making.  However, ignoring openings lessens the potential for insights 
15 
 
that could expedite low-carbon transitions; and the politics of decision-making are also under 
intense pressure to change from the profound socio-political challenges of responding to 
global climate change.  
 
Both of these overlooked aspects – strategic openings, on the one hand; and changing power 
relations, on the other – are inescapably important issues when studying low-carbon 
innovation in China: first, because the need to avoid high-carbon lock-in is particularly 
pressing; second, because many of the institutions of liberal democratic governance are 
absent or ineffective in China, and because the country’s low-carbon innovation policy and 
strategy has arguably as one of its goals the global transformation of geopolitical relations, 
through the mastery of key technologies. Early indications from this research therefore 
suggest that power might be conceptualised as not only structural and ‘locked-in’ (Tyfield, 
Ely et al., 2014) but also as “world-productive”. This suggests that systems could be 
redefined as complex dynamic systems of power relations mediated by socio-technologies, 
the generation of which, in turn, conditions changing and newly enabled or constrained 
power relations.  As summarized in Figure 4, this suggests an intelligible and empirically 
researchable conceptualisation of positive feedback loops of accelerating and deepening 
system-shifting innovation – a ‘power momentum’ of system emergence – where low-carbon 
transition is a power transition, albeit one that may unfold over several decades (Cf Arthur 
2009).   
 
Figure 4: Two Step Analysis of Emergence of a Power Socio-Technical Transition 
In both Figures 4a and 4b, the model schematically describes the process of transition 
emergence as a strategic power relational process.  Bold arrows denote the analytical focus of 
the step, while dotted lines denote processes understood to be happening but which are 
abstracted from for the purpose of this specific step in the analysis. 
 
Figure 4a: Step 1 
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Figure 4b: Step 2  
 
 
 
17 
 
Reconceptualizing transitions in this way thus affords a frame through the four heuristic 
dimensions discussed above may be not only re-introduced as central issues, but also 
understood and interrogated in terms of a both/and, rather than either/or, logic in respect of 
each dualism.  The key questions, in other words, become ‘how exactly do issues of top-down 
and bottom-up (supply and demand etc…) innovation interact at present?; how could they do 
so more productively, equitably and sustainably?; and with what broader implications 
regarding the power-relational character of societies?’ 
 
Conclusions  
 
This paper has argued that low-carbon innovation in China represents an important case study 
of innovation’s potential to contribute to more sustainable patterns of development. Drawing 
on examples from ongoing empirical work, we show how a framework attentive to issues of 
changing power relations and social practices can improve our understanding of low-carbon 
innovation in China and highlight both challenges and opportunities missed by mainstream 
analysis. As such, it highlights how low-carbon innovation in China could be a site of 
significant promise and opportunity even as high-profile projects of high-technology 
innovation continue to struggle to seed low-carbon systems transitions.   
 
In all three domains discussed (solar energy, electric urban mobility and agri-food), the 
profoundly systemic nature of the transition required – in how China eats, moves and heats 
and powers its homes – and the complex interdependencies involved in such changes 
(including across these domains), means that any low-carbon transition is likely to have far-
reaching consequences and will occur in parallel with wider changes in Chinese society, 
culture and politics.  Social and political decisions and trajectories could result in a number of 
different low-carbon scenarios: some in which inequality and social unrest continues to 
deepen, for example, and others where ‘bottom-up’ or ‘disruptive’ innovation is harnessed for 
poverty alleviation, or are even socially or politically disruptive in ways that affect existing 
power structures, including those bound up with Chinese ‘carbon (state-) capital’. These are 
some of many preliminary findings that we will be exploring further, in the course of our 
research.  
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